Abstract
A theory of dynamic optimal resource allocation to R and D in an n-firm industry is developed using differential games. This technique represents a synthesis of the analytic methods previously applied to the problem: static game theory and optimal control. The use of particular functional forms allows the computation and detailed discussion of the Nash equilibrium in investment rules.
Keywords
Mathematical economicsEconomicsSequential gameMicroeconomicsGame theory
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1982
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 671-671
- Citations
- 374
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Jennifer F. Reinganum
(1982).
A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior.
Econometrica
, 50
(3)
, 671-671.
https://doi.org/10.2307/1912607
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.2307/1912607