Keywords
Capital expenditureStock (firearms)Monetary economicsEconomicsEvent studyCapital marketEnterprise valueCapital (architecture)BusinessSample (material)Cost of capitalValue (mathematics)Stock marketMarket valueFinancial economicsFinanceMicroeconomics
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1985
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 399-422
- Citations
- 868
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
John J. McConnell,
Chris J. Muscarella
(1985).
Corporate capital expenditure decisions and the market value of the firm.
Journal of Financial Economics
, 14
(3)
, 399-422.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(85)90006-6
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.1016/0304-405x(85)90006-6