Abstract

This paper presents an analysis of the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry based on and related to the current antitrust case involving its leading producers. A spatial competition comparison framework is employed, with brands assumed relatively immobile. It is argued that the industry's conduct, in which price competition is avoided and rivalry focuses on new brand introductions, tends to deter entry and protect profits. Entry into a new segment of the market in the 1970s is discussed. Relevant welfare-theoretic issues are analyzed, and it is argued that the remedy proposed by the FTC is likely to improve performance.

Keywords

Breakfast cerealDeterrence (psychology)EconomicsMonetary economicsAgricultural economicsFood scienceChemistryLaw and economics

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Publication Info

Year
1978
Type
article
Volume
9
Issue
2
Pages
305-305
Citations
907
Access
Closed

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Richard Schmalensee (1978). Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry. The Bell Journal of Economics , 9 (2) , 305-305. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003584

Identifiers

DOI
10.2307/3003584