Abstract
One may define a concept of an n -person game in which each player has a finite set of pure strategies and in which a definite set of payments to the n players corresponds to each n -tuple of pure strategies, one strategy being taken for each player. For mixed strategies, which are probability distributions over the pure strategies, the pay-off functions are the expectations of the players, thus becoming polylinear forms …
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Mathematical economicsComputer scienceMathematics
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1950
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 48-49
- Citations
- 7066
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
John F. Nash
(1950).
Equilibrium points in <i>n</i> -person games.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
, 36
(1)
, 48-49.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.36.1.48
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.1073/pnas.36.1.48