Abstract We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on what fraction of the company to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder's decision is shaped by the legal environment. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo‐Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross‐country evidence.
This paper focuses on the socialization of potential successors in family business and attempts to relate this process to values that founders intend to convey to the next gener...
We investigate the relation between management ownership and corporate performance, as measured by Tobin's Q.In a cross-section of Fortune 500 firms, Tobin's Q first increases a...
This study surveys the literature examining the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) We review the history of privatization, the theoretical and empirical evidence on...
Abstract Purpose – This paper attempts to reconcile two opposing views of the strategies and conduct of closely held firms: that of entrepreneurship and that of family business....
ABSTRACT This paper relates cross‐sectional differences in returns on Japanese stocks to the underlying behavior of four variables: earnings yield, size, book to market ratio, a...
Social media, news, blog, policy document mentions