Abstract
This paper provides empirical evidence on the effects of financial repression on government finances. Financial repression is a combination of controls on international capital flows with restrictions on domestic interest rates. The result is an artificially low cost of domestic funding to governments. The authors estimate the government revenue from financial repression as the difference between the foreign and the domestic cost of funds, times the domestic stock of government debt. The evidence indicates that the revenue from financial repression can be quite substantial and, for several countries, it is of the same order of magnitude as seigniorage. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.
Keywords
Affiliated Institutions
Related Publications
Protection of minority interest and the development of security markets
While excessive regulation is an obstacle to the development of financial markets, we argue that lack of basic rules or poorly enforced regulation may explain the relative impor...
The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public
From the viewpoint of a company's controlling shareholder, the optimal ownership structure generally involves some measure of dispersion, to avoid excessive monitoring by other ...
Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany
This book analyses the widely-held view of the merits of the 'bank-based' German system of finance for investment, and shows that this view is not supported by evidence from the...
A Historical Comparison of Resource-Based Theory and Five Schools of Thought Within Industrial Organization Economics: Do We Have a New Theory of the Firm?
A resource-based approach to strategic management focuses on costly-to-copy attributes of the firm as sources of economic rents and, therefore, as the fundamental drivers of per...
Publication Info
- Year
- 1991
- Type
- article
- Citations
- 60
- Access
- Closed
External Links
Social Impact
Social media, news, blog, policy document mentions
Citation Metrics
Cite This
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.3386/w3604