Abstract
I. The price system and the firm, 399. — II. The control of information, 402. — III. Information and expectations, 405. — IV. The division of knowledge, 411. — V. The firm's decision mechanism, 417. — VI. Conclusion, 420.
Keywords
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1961
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 75
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 399-399
- Citations
- 261
- Access
- Closed
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Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.2307/1885131