Abstract
This article examines the institutional preconditions or rules that shape collaborative natural resource management between public agencies and citizen groups. In particular, it asks: How do the preconditions surrounding a given natural resource, such as property rights, legislative frameworks, and agency performance incentives, circumscribe the possibilities for collaboration? Drawing upon irrigation and forest management policies and practices in India from the mid-1800s onward, it is argued that the context of irrigation provides some opportunities for supporting agency-citizen collaboration, whereas such efforts in forestry are unlikely to succeed without fundamental structural change.
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Publication Info
- Year
- 2004
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 208-242
- Citations
- 29
- Access
- Closed
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Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.1177/0095399704263481