Abstract

Journal Article Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design Get access Bengt Holmstrom, Bengt Holmstrom Yale University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Paul Milgrom Paul Milgrom Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Volume 7, Issue special_issue, January 1991, Pages 24–52, https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 Published: 01 January 1991

Keywords

Principal (computer security)IncentiveAsset (computer security)Principal–agent problemEconomicsLaw and economicsManagementMicroeconomicsComputer scienceCorporate governance

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Publication Info

Year
1991
Type
article
Volume
7
Issue
special_issue
Pages
24-52
Citations
5964
Access
Closed

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5964
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3711
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Cite This

Bengt Holmström, Paul Milgrom (1991). Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. The Journal of Law Economics and Organization , 7 (special_issue) , 24-52. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24

Identifiers

DOI
10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24

Data Quality

Data completeness: 77%