Abstract
This paper considers the problem faced by a seller who has a single object to sell to one of several possible buyers, when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object. The seller's problem is to design an auction game which has a Nash equilibrium giving him the highest possible expected utility. Optimal auctions are derived in this paper for a wide class of auction design problems.
Keywords
Common value auctionObject (grammar)Nash equilibriumForward auctionClass (philosophy)Mathematical economicsPerfect informationMechanism designAuction theoryCombinatorial auctionImperfectRevenue equivalenceMathematicsMathematical optimizationComputer scienceMicroeconomicsEconomicsArtificial intelligence
Affiliated Institutions
Related Publications
MATPOWER's extensible optimal power flow architecture
This paper describes the optimal power flow (OPF) architecture implemented in MATPOWER, an open-source Matlab power system simulation package. It utilizes an extensible architec...
Complementarity and Long-Range Projections
This article studies the implications of complementarity on the problem of the long-term forecast. The conditions for maintaining long-run equilibrium between factor demand and ...
New tight frames of curvelets and optimal representations of objects with piecewise <i>C</i><sup>2</sup> singularities
Abstract This paper introduces new tight frames of curvelets to address the problem of finding optimally sparse representations of objects with discontinuities along piecewise C...
Boosting with Maximum Adaptive Sampling
Classical Boosting algorithms, such as AdaBoost, build a strong classifier without concern about the computational cost. Some applications, in particular in computer vision, may...
DL_POLY_3: new dimensions in molecular dynamics simulations via massive parallelism
DL_POLY_3 is a general-purpose massively parallel molecular dynamics simulation package \nembedding a highly efficient set of methods and algorithms such as: Domain Decompos...
Publication Info
- Year
- 1981
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 58-73
- Citations
- 5977
- Access
- Closed
External Links
Social Impact
Altmetric
PlumX Metrics
Social media, news, blog, policy document mentions
Citation Metrics
5977
OpenAlex
Cite This
Roger B. Myerson
(1981).
Optimal Auction Design.
Mathematics of Operations Research
, 6
(1)
, 58-73.
https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.1287/moor.6.1.58