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Publication Info
- Year
- 1982
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 275-287
- Citations
- 265
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Douglas W. Diamond,
Robert E. Verrecchia
(1982).
Optimal Managerial Contracts and Equilibrium Security Prices.
The Journal of Finance
, 37
(2)
, 275-287.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03550.x
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03550.x