Abstract
I. The competitive allocation of insurance under moral hazard, 45. — II. "Competitive" equilibrium, 50. — III. Moral hazard and public provision, 52. — IV. Adverse selection and the competitive market, 54. — V. Alternative devices for dealing with adverse selection and moral hazard from overinsurance, 60.
Keywords
Adverse selectionMoral hazardSelection (genetic algorithm)Actuarial scienceBusinessHazardMorale hazardEconomicsComputer scienceCasualty insuranceInsurance policyRisk poolIncentiveBiologyMicroeconomicsArtificial intelligenceEcology
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1974
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 88
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 44-44
- Citations
- 710
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Mark V. Pauly
(1974).
Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
, 88
(1)
, 44-44.
https://doi.org/10.2307/1881793
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.2307/1881793