Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to set forth a sense in which programs can and do explain behavior, and to distinguish from this a number of senses in which they do not. Once we are tolerably clear concerning the sort of explanatory strategy being employed, two rather interesting facts emerge; (1) though it is true that programs are “internally represented,” this fact has no explanatory interest beyond the mere fact that the program is executed; (2) programs which are couched in information processing terms may have an explanatory interest for a given range of behavior which is independent of physiological explanations of the same range of behavior.

Keywords

sortEpistemologySet (abstract data type)Range (aeronautics)Computer sciencePsychologyPhilosophyInformation retrieval

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Publication Info

Year
1977
Type
article
Volume
44
Issue
2
Pages
269-287
Citations
129
Access
Closed

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Robert Cummins (1977). Programs in the Explanation of Behavior. Philosophy of Science , 44 (2) , 269-287. https://doi.org/10.1086/288742

Identifiers

DOI
10.1086/288742