Abstract
When elementary quantum systems, such as polarized photons, are used to transmit digital information, the uncertainty principle gives rise to novel cryptographic phenomena unachievable with traditional transmission media, e.g. a communications channel on which it is impossible in principle to eavesdrop without a high probability of disturbing the transmission in such a way as to be detected. Such a quantum channel can be used in conjunction with ordinary insecure classical channels to distribute random key information between two users with the assurance that it remains unknown to anyone else, even when the users share no secret information initially. We also present a protocol for coin-tossing by exchange of quantum messages, which is secure against traditional kinds of cheating, even by an opponent with unlimited computing power, but ironically can be subverted by use of a still subtler quantum phenomenon, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox.
Keywords
Coin flippingPublic-key cryptographyCryptographyComputer securityKey (lock)ID-based cryptographyComputer scienceMathematicsKey distributionInternet privacyEncryptionStatistics
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Publication Info
- Year
- 2020
- Type
- article
- Pages
- 175-179
- Citations
- 5306
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
C. H. Bennett
(2020).
Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing.
arXiv (Cornell University)
, 175-179.
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2003.06557
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.48550/arxiv.2003.06557