Keywords
EconomicsExternalityMicroeconomicsSelection (genetic algorithm)Rent-seekingOptimal allocationComputer science
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1995
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 17-33
- Citations
- 446
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Daron Acemoğlu
(1995).
Reward structures and the allocation of talent.
European Economic Review
, 39
(1)
, 17-33.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(94)00014-q
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.1016/0014-2921(94)00014-q