Keywords
EconomicsDiscretionReputationMonetary policyInflation (cosmology)Monetary economicsIncentiveDynamic inconsistencyMicroeconomicsLaw
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1983
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 101-121
- Citations
- 3556
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Robert J. Barro,
D. Benjamin Gordon
(1983).
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy.
Journal of Monetary Economics
, 12
(1)
, 101-121.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(83)90051-x
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.1016/0304-3932(83)90051-x