Abstract
Maintaining robust cooperation in interfirm strategic alliances poses special problems. Such relationships have received growing attention in recent research grounded in game theory, which has suggested that some alliance structures are inherently more likely than others to be associated with high opportunity to cheat, high behavioral uncertainty, and poor stability, longevity, and performance. The present study merged these theoretical insights with the logic of transaction cost economics in a general model of alliance structuring and tested it with data from 111 interfirm alliances. Findings generally supported the model and hypotheses, suggesting the need for a greater focus on game theoretic structural dimensions and institutional responses to perceived opportunism in the study of voluntary interfirm cooperation.
Keywords
StructuringTransaction costAllianceBusinessStrategic allianceIndustrial organizationDatabase transactionGame theoryOperations managementKnowledge managementMarketingMicroeconomicsProcess managementComputer scienceEconomicsFinance
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1993
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 794-829
- Citations
- 2594
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Arvind Parkhe
(1993).
STRATEGIC ALLIANCE STRUCTURING: A GAME THEORETIC AND TRANSACTION COST EXAMINATION OF INTERFIRM COOPERATION..
Academy of Management Journal
, 36
(4)
, 794-829.
https://doi.org/10.2307/256759
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.2307/256759