Keywords
Subordination (linguistics)Agency (philosophy)IncentiveCapital (architecture)Complement (music)PoliticsCapital marketEconomicsPrincipal–agent problemBusinessFinanceMarket economySociologyPolitical scienceCorporate governanceLaw
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1990
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 89-114
- Citations
- 106
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Joseph A. Grundfest
(1990).
Subordination of American capital.
Journal of Financial Economics
, 27
(1)
, 89-114.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(90)90022-r
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.1016/0304-405x(90)90022-r