Abstract
When a takeover or merger is being considered, boards of directors are responsible for making decisions that best benefit their shareholders.
Keywords
ShareholderRemunerationMarket for corporate controlBusinessCorporate governanceTender offerControl (management)Agency (philosophy)AccountingAgency costEconomicsMonetary economicsFinanceManagement
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1987
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 157-168
- Citations
- 50
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Murray L Weidenbaum,
Stephen C. Vogt
(1987).
Takeovers and Stockholders: Winners and Losers.
California Management Review
, 29
(4)
, 157-168.
https://doi.org/10.2307/41162137
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.2307/41162137