Abstract

“Interdependence” has long been a cardinal element in theoretical analyses of international politics, but its utility has been hampered by disagreements over both the meaning of the term and its links to changes in state behavior. This article provides a general framework for resolving those debates by using a game-theoretic analysis developed by Kelley and Thibaut. Their work demonstrates that past calls for choosing between the concepts of vulnerability and sensitivity are misplaced. The first measures dependence, the second interdependence. Only by using both—and by combining them with a third measure, independence—can we fully model the interactions of states in international politics. With such a complete model we can then begin to understand why some seemingly baneful issues in international politics (such as Mutual Assured Destruction) can still lead to cooperative outcomes, while some apparently benign issues (such as free trade) often lead to conflict. Finally, the article offers some preliminary propositions on the connection between interdependence and cooperation, tying those propositions to the measures of interdependence developed by earlier analysts.

Keywords

TyingPoliticsMeaning (existential)Economic interdependenceIndependence (probability theory)Vulnerability (computing)International relationsPositive economicsElement (criminal law)EconomicsLaw and economicsState (computer science)SociologyPolitical scienceEpistemologyMicroeconomicsComputer scienceLawComputer security

Affiliated Institutions

Related Publications

Publication Info

Year
1993
Type
article
Volume
37
Issue
3
Pages
321-321
Citations
36
Access
Closed

External Links

Social Impact

Altmetric

Social media, news, blog, policy document mentions

Citation Metrics

36
OpenAlex

Cite This

John A. Kroll (1993). The Complexity of Interdependence. International Studies Quarterly , 37 (3) , 321-321. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600811

Identifiers

DOI
10.2307/2600811