Keywords
Tender offerCashDutyState (computer science)Corporate lawValue (mathematics)DownloadPolitical scienceManagementLawLibrary scienceEconomicsLaw and economicsFinanceShareholderComputer science
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1980
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 371-407
- Citations
- 259
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Gregg A. Jarrell,
Michael Bradley
(1980).
The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers.
The Journal of Law and Economics
, 23
(2)
, 371-407.
https://doi.org/10.1086/466965
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.1086/466965