Abstract
Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent that rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.
Keywords
IntuitionismSocial intuitionismMoral reasoningEpistemologyPsychologyMoral psychologyLawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral developmentMoral disengagementSocial psychologyMoral developmentSociologyMoral authorityPhilosophy
MeSH Terms
EmotionsHumansIntuitionMoralsProblem SolvingSocial PerceptionSocial Values
Affiliated Institutions
Related Publications
Morality judgments: Tests of an averaging model.
Pairs of items describing objectionable behaviors were rated for their overall morality. Contrary to additive or constant-weig ht averaging models, the ratings were demonstrated...
An opponent-process theory of motivation: II. Cigarette addiction.
Presents 6 examples of affective, hedonic, or motivational phenomena based on behavioral, experimental, and observational studies. The behavioral, EKG, and emotional responses o...
Judgment Misguided
Abstract People often follow intuitive principles of decision making, ranging from group loyalty to the belief that nature is benign. But instead of using these principles as ru...
The psychology of being "right": The problem of accuracy in social perception and cognition.
Several difficulties are noted with general questions psychologists have been asking about human accuracy, such as whether people are typically accurate or inaccurate, what the ...
Self‐esteem and responses to success and failure: Subsequent performance and intrinsic motivation
Abstract A model is proposed in which the goal of people with high self‐esteem is to cultivate personal strengths in order to excel, whereas the goal of people with low self‐est...
Publication Info
- Year
- 2001
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 814-834
- Citations
- 7657
- Access
- Closed
External Links
Social Impact
Altmetric
PlumX Metrics
Social media, news, blog, policy document mentions
Citation Metrics
7657
OpenAlex
859
Influential
4878
CrossRef
Cite This
Jonathan Haidt
(2001).
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment..
Psychological Review
, 108
(4)
, 814-834.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814
- PMID
- 11699120