Abstract
Two kinds of models for a productive organization are presented. In the first, both production and rewards are based on the performance of individuals, which is perfectly observed. Their abilities are not observable. Despite this, theorems are proved giving strong grounds for the equality of wages and marginal products unless there is monopsony in the labor market. This latter case is also discussed. The second model, which focuses on the imperfect observation of performance, allows interesting deductions about optimal payment schedules and organizational structure.
Keywords
IncentiveEconomicsMicroeconomicsIndustrial organizationPublic economics
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1976
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 105-105
- Citations
- 875
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
James A. Mirrlees
(1976).
The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization.
The Bell Journal of Economics
, 7
(1)
, 105-105.
https://doi.org/10.2307/3003192
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.2307/3003192