Abstract

I. Elements of a Theory of Strategy 1. The Retarded Science of International Strategy 2. An Essay on Bargaining 3. Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War II. A Reorientation of Game Theory 4. Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision 5. Enforcement, Communication, and Strategic Moves 6. Game Theory and Experimental Research III. Strategy with a Random Ingredient 7. Randomization of Promises and Threats 8. The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance IV. Surprise Attack: A Study in Mutual Distrust 9. The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack 10. Surprise Attack and Disarmament Appendices A. Nuclear Weapons and Limited War B. For the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game Theory C. Re-interpretation of a Solution Concept for Noncooperative Games Index

Keywords

SurpriseAbandonment (legal)Game theoryDisarmamentDistrustInterpretation (philosophy)Nuclear strategyPolitical scienceEconomicsLawMathematical economicsSocial psychologyNuclear weaponPsychologyComputer science

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Publication Info

Year
1960
Type
book
Citations
7130
Access
Closed

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Thomas C. Schelling (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. .