Abstract
This paper examines factors influencing voluntary forecast disclosure by target companies, whether good/bad news forecasts are disclosed and the influence of forecasts on the outcome of hostile bids. Disclosure was significantly more likely during contested bids. In agreed bids, probability of forecast disclosure was greater the shorter the bid horizon. In contested bids, forecasts were more likely where there were large block shareholdings, for larger targets and for targets in the capital goods industry. There was a clear tendency to disclose good news forecasts. A significant positive association between forecast disclosure and increase in offer price was found.
Keywords
Voluntary disclosureProfit (economics)BusinessOutcome (game theory)AccountingEconomicsActuarial scienceMicroeconomics
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1999
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 7-8
- Pages
- 883-917
- Citations
- 102
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Niamh Brennan
(1999).
Voluntary Disclosure of Profit Forecasts by Target Companies in Takeover Bids.
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
, 26
(7-8)
, 883-917.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5957.00279
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.1111/1468-5957.00279