Abstract
This note uses information on a sample of sixteen OECD countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance. As previous work suggests, politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation. However, the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth, unemployment, or the ex ante real interest rate. Copyright 1993 by Ohio State University Press.
Keywords
Independence (probability theory)Ex-anteInflation (cosmology)EconomicsUnemploymentCentral bankMonetary policySample (material)Control variableMonetary economicsWork (physics)Inflation targetingPoliticsMacroeconomicsPolitical science
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1993
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 151-151
- Citations
- 1780
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Alberto Alesina,
Lawrence H. Summers
(1993).
Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence.
Journal of money credit and banking
, 25
(2)
, 151-151.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2077833
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.2307/2077833