Abstract
The impact of central bank independence and wage-bargaining structure on inflation and unemployment is explored theoretically and tested empirically for a sample of 17 OECD countries over two separate periods. The results suggest that inflation is lower in economies with greater central bank independence and that the equilibrium unemployment rate depends on the structure of the labour market. Greater central bank independence does not appear to be associated with higher unemployment.
Keywords
Independence (probability theory)Wage bargainingWageEconomicsCentral bankMonetary economicsLabour economicsMonetary policy
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1996
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 20-38
- Citations
- 137
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Michael Bleaney
(1996).
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE, WAGE-BARGAINING STRUCTURE, AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN OECD COUNTRIES.
Oxford Economic Papers
, 48
(1)
, 20-38.
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028559
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028559