Abstract

The basic hypothesis is that, while the total supply of entrepreneurs varies among societies, the productive contribution of the society's entrepreneurial activities varies much more because of their allocation between productive activities, such as innovation, and largely unproductive activities, such as rent seeking or organized crime. This allocation is heavily influenced by the relative payoffs society offers to such activities. This implies that policy can influence the allocation of entrepreneurship more effectively than it can influence its supply. Historical evidence from ancient Rome, early China, and the Middle Ages and Renaissance in Europe is used to investigate the hypotheses. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.

Keywords

EntrepreneurshipThe RenaissanceChinaEconomicsOptimal allocationTime allocationEconomic systemPolitical scienceManagementHistoryLaw

Affiliated Institutions

Related Publications

Publication Info

Year
1990
Type
article
Volume
98
Issue
5, Part 1
Pages
893-921
Citations
3525
Access
Closed

External Links

Social Impact

Social media, news, blog, policy document mentions

Citation Metrics

3525
OpenAlex

Cite This

William J. Baumöl (1990). Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive. Journal of Political Economy , 98 (5, Part 1) , 893-921. https://doi.org/10.1086/261712

Identifiers

DOI
10.1086/261712