Abstract
The key assumption of managerial revolution theory-that ownership is separated from control in large corporations-has important consequences for theories of class structure and economic development. If managers do not act in the interest of proprietors, theories based on property ownership are obsolete. Furthermore, the growth patterns of capitalist societies would be altered if large corporations protect managerial interests rather than owner interests. We examined managerial revolution theory by studying the relationship between the dismissal of corporate chiefs and various structural variables (including five measures of manager/owner control) for 286 of the 300 largest industrial firms in 1964. Our results do not support managerial revolution theory. Profit performance most affects the probability that the chief will be fired, and type of control has little effect. Profit performance appears to be an effective constraint on the behavior of both managerially-controlled and owner-controlledfirms.
Keywords
CorporationAutonomyProfit (economics)Theory of the firmEconomicsManagementBusinessAccountingFinancePolitical scienceMicroeconomicsLaw
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1981
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-1
- Citations
- 160
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
David R. James,
Michael Soref
(1981).
Profit Constraints on Managerial Autonomy: Managerial Theory and the Unmaking of the Corporation President.
American Sociological Review
, 46
(1)
, 1-1.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2095023
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.2307/2095023