How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond “Heuristics and Biases”

1991 European Review of Social Psychology 1,143 citations

Abstract

Most so-called "errors" in probabilistic reasoning are in fact not violations of probability theory. Examples of such "errors" include overconfidence bias, conjunction fallacy, and base-rate neglect. Researchers have relied on a very narrow normative view, and have ignored conceptual distinctions—e.g. single case versus relative frequency—fundamental to probability theory. By recognizing and using these distinctions, however, we can make apparently stable "errors" disappear, reappear, or even invert. I suggest what a reformed understanding of judgments under uncertainty might look like.

Keywords

Overconfidence effectPsychologyNormativeCognitive biasNeglectIllusionHeuristicsProbabilistic logicConfirmation biasFallacyCognitive psychologyCognitionSocial psychologyEpistemologyComputer sciencePhilosophy

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Publication Info

Year
1991
Type
review
Volume
2
Issue
1
Pages
83-115
Citations
1143
Access
Closed

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Gerd Gigerenzer (1991). How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond “Heuristics and Biases”. European Review of Social Psychology , 2 (1) , 83-115. https://doi.org/10.1080/14792779143000033

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DOI
10.1080/14792779143000033