Abstract
Common-pool resources (CPR) are treated as if they were fully described by two characteristics-difficulty of exclusion and subtractability of yield. We focus upon two additional characteristics, mobile flows and storage in the resource. In examining CPR settings involving fisheries, irrigation systems, and groundwater basins, we find that users of these resources pursue different strategies and design different institutional arrangements depending upon whether the resource is characterized by mobile flows and/or storage. From this evidence, we develop a typology of CPRs that is useful for understanding and anticipating resource users' strategies in confronting and solving common-pool problems.
Keywords
BusinessComputer scienceEnvironmental economicsEconomics
Related Publications
The Coopers & Lybrand Sec Manual
Partial table of contents: INTRODUCTION TO SEC PRACTICE. Legislation Governing SEC Practice. Organization of the SEC. Shelf Registration. ACCOUNTANTS' REPORTS AND RELATED MATTER...
Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment: Response to Kaplan and Zingales
Kaplan and Zingales (1995, hereafter KZ) criticize Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988, hereafter FHP) and much ensuing research that uses cross-sectional differences in firm be...
Publication Info
- Year
- 1994
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 294-294
- Citations
- 264
- Access
- Closed
External Links
Social Impact
Altmetric
PlumX Metrics
Social media, news, blog, policy document mentions
Citation Metrics
264
OpenAlex
Cite This
Edella Schlager,
William Blomquist,
Shui Yan Tang
(1994).
Mobile Flows, Storage, and Self-Organized Institutions for Governing Common-Pool Resources.
Land Economics
, 70
(3)
, 294-294.
https://doi.org/10.2307/3146531
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.2307/3146531