Keywords
IncentiveBusinessAccountingCorporate financeCorporate governanceFinanceFinancial systemEconomicsMicroeconomics
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1982
- Type
- article
- Pages
- 107-140
- Citations
- 1110
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Sanford J. Grossman,
Oliver Hart
(1982).
Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
, 107-140.