Abstract

We propose a model of motivated skepticism that helps explain when and why citizens are biased‐information processors. Two experimental studies explore how citizens evaluate arguments about affirmative action and gun control, finding strong evidence of a prior attitude effect such that attitudinally congruent arguments are evaluated as stronger than attitudinally incongruent arguments. When reading pro and con arguments, participants (Ps) counterargue the contrary arguments and uncritically accept supporting arguments, evidence of a disconfirmation bias. We also find a confirmation bias—the seeking out of confirmatory evidence—when Ps are free to self‐select the source of the arguments they read. Both the confirmation and disconfirmation biases lead to attitude polarization—the strengthening of t 2 over t 1 attitudes—especially among those with the strongest priors and highest levels of political sophistication. We conclude with a discussion of the normative implications of these findings for rational behavior in a democracy.

Keywords

SkepticismMotivated reasoningPsychologyNormativePoliticsSocial psychologySophisticationPositive economicsEpistemologyPolitical scienceSociologyEconomicsLawPhilosophySocial science

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Publication Info

Year
2006
Type
article
Volume
50
Issue
3
Pages
755-769
Citations
4077
Access
Closed

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Charles S. Taber, Milton Lodge (2006). Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs. American Journal of Political Science , 50 (3) , 755-769. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00214.x

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DOI
10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00214.x