Keywords
DebtShareholderEquity (law)Dividend policyIncentiveEconomicsValue (mathematics)Production (economics)DividendBondControl (management)BusinessInvestment policyEquity valueFinanceInvestment (military)Enterprise valueMonetary economicsMicroeconomicsCorporate governanceInternal debtDebt levels and flows
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1979
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 117-161
- Citations
- 3001
- Access
- Closed
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Cite This
Clifford W. Smith,
Jerold B. Warner
(1979).
On financial contracting.
Journal of Financial Economics
, 7
(2)
, 117-161.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(79)90011-4
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.1016/0304-405x(79)90011-4