Abstract
switching costs, lock-in, long-term relationships, contracts, opportunism, Social and Behavioral Sciences, Business
Keywords
UnobservableVerifiable secret sharingMicroeconomicsTerm (time)EconomicsOutcome (game theory)Quality (philosophy)Set (abstract data type)Product (mathematics)WelfareDynamic inconsistencyBusinessComputer scienceEconometrics
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Publication Info
- Year
- 1987
- Type
- article
- Volume
- 79
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 51-68
- Citations
- 105
- Access
- Closed
External Links
Citation Metrics
105
OpenAlex
Cite This
Joseph Farrell,
Carl Shapiro
(1987).
Optimal Contracts with Lock-In.
eScholarship (California Digital Library)
, 79
(1)
, 51-68.