Abstract

Popular belief is that ownership change (from public to private) brings about improved performance. But (i) ownership displays a spectrum, not an either/or; (ii) degree of competition is conceptually and often actually independent of ownership; and (iii) so is change‐of‐ownership's assumed instruments for improving performance, change in managerial incentive structures and reporting structures. The article surveys the relevant theories, popular and scholarly, and develops models for testing the relationships between status change (ownership) and performance (indices of productivity, profitability etc.), and between status change and internal organizational change (indices of reorganization and of linkage), in a small number of British organizations which underwent change in recent decades. Preliminary results of one or two analyses illustrate the methods and the possibilities.

Keywords

IncentiveProfitability indexLinkage (software)Competition (biology)ProductivityOrganizational changeOrganizational performancePublic sectorBusinessIndustrial organizationPublic ownershipEconomicsPublic economicsPublic relationsMicroeconomicsMarketingPolitical scienceEconomic growthFinanceEconomy

Affiliated Institutions

Related Publications

Publication Info

Year
1988
Type
article
Volume
66
Issue
4
Pages
363-388
Citations
72
Access
Closed

External Links

Social Impact

Social media, news, blog, policy document mentions

Citation Metrics

72
OpenAlex

Cite This

Andrew Dunsire, Keith Hartley, David Parker et al. (1988). ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS AND PERFORMANCE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR TESTING PUBLIC CHOICE THEORIES. Public Administration , 66 (4) , 363-388. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1988.tb00701.x

Identifiers

DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9299.1988.tb00701.x