Abstract

Expected utility theory has dominated the analysis of decision making under risk. It has been generally accepted as a normative model of rational choice (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976), and widely applied as a descriptive model of economic behavior (e.g., Friedman and Savage, 1948, and Arrow, 1971). Thus, it is assumed that all reasonable people would wish to obey the axioms of the theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944, and Savage, 1954), and that most people actually do, most of the time.

Keywords

AxiomArrowNormativeExpected utility hypothesisSubjective expected utilityMathematical economicsDecision theoryVon Neumann architectureVon Neumann–Morgenstern utility theoremEconomicsPositive economicsComputer scienceEpistemologyMicroeconomicsMathematicsPhilosophy

Affiliated Institutions

Related Publications

Publication Info

Year
1988
Type
book-chapter
Pages
183-214
Citations
33001
Access
Closed

External Links

Social Impact

Social media, news, blog, policy document mentions

Citation Metrics

33001
OpenAlex

Cite This

Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky (1988). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Cambridge University Press eBooks , 183-214. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014

Identifiers

DOI
10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014