Amos Tversky

Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability

On the psychology of prediction.

In this paper, we explore the rules that determine intuitive predictions and judgments of confidence and contrast these rules to the normative principles of statistical predicti...

Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness

Belief in the law of small numbers.

Reports that people have erroneous intuitions about the laws of chance. In particular, they regard a sample randomly drawn from a population as highly representative, I.e., simi...

Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk

This paper presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and develops an alternative model, called prospect theory. Choice...

The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice

The psychological principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the s...

Representations of perceptions of risks.

Abstract : The perceptions of risks (e.g., diseases, accidents, natural hazards) is investigated using a multi-task, multi-model approach. We studied the proximities among 18 ri...

Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases

Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases

Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk

Expected utility theory has dominated the analysis of decision making under risk. It has been generally accepted as a normative model of rational choice (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976...