Abstract

The psychological principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in different ways. Reversals of preference are demonstrated in choices regarding monetary outcomes, both hypothetical and real, and in questions pertaining to the loss of human lives. The effects of frames on preferences are compared to the effects of perspectives on perceptual appearance. The dependence of preferences on the formulation of decision problems is a significant concern for the theory of rational choice.

Keywords

Framing effectFraming (construction)PerceptionPreferencePsychologySocial psychologyProspect theoryExpected utility hypothesisDecision theoryCognitive psychologyEconomicsMicroeconomicsMathematical economicsPersuasion

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Publication Info

Year
1981
Type
article
Volume
211
Issue
4481
Pages
453-458
Citations
16870
Access
Closed

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Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman (1981). The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. Science , 211 (4481) , 453-458. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7455683

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DOI
10.1126/science.7455683