Managers, Owners, and The Pricing of Risky Debt: An Empirical Analysis

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article examines managerial ownership structure and return premia on corporate bonds. It is argued that when managerial ownership is low, an increase in managerial ownership increases management's incentives to increase stockholder wealth at the expense of bondholder wealth. When ownership increases more, however, it is argued that management becomes more risk averse, with incentives more closely aligned with bondholders. This study finds a positive relation between managerial ownership and bond return premia in the low to medium (5 to 25 percent) ownership range. There is also weak evidence for a nonpositive relation in the large (over 25 percent) ownership range.

Keywords

IncentiveShareholderDebtBusinessBondCorporate debtMonetary economicsEconomicsFinancial economicsCorporate governanceMicroeconomicsFinance

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Publication Info

Year: 1994
Type: article
Volume: 49
Issue: 2
Pages: 453-477
Citations: 99
Access: Closed

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APA Style

                            
                                
                                    Elizabeth Strock Bagnani, 
                                
                                    Nikolaos T. Milonas, 
                                
                                    Anthony Saunders
                                
                                et al.
                            
                            (1994). 
                            Managers, Owners, and The Pricing of Risky Debt: An Empirical Analysis. 
                            The Journal of Finance
                            , 49
                            (2)
                            , 453-477.
                            https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb05148.x
                        

Identifiers

DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb05148.x