Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana

1995 Journal of Political Economy 1,939 citations

Abstract

This paper examines the link between property rights and investment incentives. The author develops three theoretical arguments based on security of tenure, using land as collateral and obtaining gains from trade. The paper then presents empirical evidence from two regions in Ghana. The author investigates the possibility that rights are endogenous, with farmers making improvements to enhance their land rights. Finally, he suggests tests for which of the theories might explain the results. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.

Keywords

Property rightsCollateralIncentiveInvestment (military)EconomicsEmpirical evidencePublic economicsMicroeconomicsFinanceLawPolitical sciencePolitics

Related Publications

Publication Info

Year
1995
Type
article
Volume
103
Issue
5
Pages
903-937
Citations
1939
Access
Closed

External Links

Social Impact

Social media, news, blog, policy document mentions

Citation Metrics

1939
OpenAlex

Cite This

Timothy Besley (1995). Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana. Journal of Political Economy , 103 (5) , 903-937. https://doi.org/10.1086/262008

Identifiers

DOI
10.1086/262008