Pricing information bundles in a dynamic environment

Abstract

We explore a scenario in which a monopolist producer of information goods seeks to maximize its profits in a market where consumer demand shifts frequently and unpredictably. The producer may set an arbitrarily complex price schedule---a function that maps the set of purchased items to a price. However, lacking direct knowledge of consumer demand, it cannotcompute the optimal schedule. Instead, it attempts to optimize profits via trial and error. By means of a simple model of consumer demand and a modified version of a simple nonlinear optimization routine, we study a variety of parametrizations of the price schedule and quantify some of the relationships among learnability, complexity, and profitability. In particular, we show that fixed pricing or simple two-parameter dynamic pricing schedules are preferred when demand shifts frequently, but that dynamic pricing based on more complex schedules tends to be most profitable when demand shifts very infrequently.

Keywords

Affiliated Institutions

• University of Michigan US
• IBM (United States) US

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